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Abstract 
This  paper  develops  an  open  economy  firm-heterogeneous  model 
where  the  combination  of  market  rigidities  and  exchange  rate 
uncertainty acts like a barrier to trade and modifies a firm's optimal 
choice in terms of production and pricing. The existence of price and 
labour rigidities, coupled with imperfect financial development and 
exchange  rate  uncertainty,  separates  incumbent  firms  into  (1) 
domestic producers, (2) exporters setting the price in national currency 
and (3) more productive exporters pricing in foreign currency. The 
model  predicts  that  only  where  financial  development  is  limited  a 
reduction in exchange rate uncertainty raises a firm's profit, lowers 
prices, and induces new firms to export. Fully financially integrated 
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Abstract
This paper develops an open economy ￿rm-heterogeneous model where the com-
bination of market rigidities and exchange rate uncertainty acts like a barrier
to trade and modi￿es a ￿rm’s optimal choice in terms of production and pric-
ing. The existence of price and labor rigidities, coupled with imperfect ￿nancial
development and exchange rate uncertainty, separates incumbent ￿rms into (1)
domestic producers, (2) exporters setting the price in national currency and
(30 more productive exporters pricing in foreign currency. The model predicts
that only where ￿nancial development is limited a reduction in exchange rate
uncertainty raises a ￿rm’s pro￿t, lowers prices, and induces new ￿rms to export.
Fully ￿nancially integrated countries are insulated from exchange rate risk.
Keywords: exchange rate uncertainty; ￿rm heterogeneity; market rigidity; ￿nancial
restraints.
JEL Classi￿cation: F1; F12; F16; F152 Heterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints
1 Introduction
The economic debate around the consequences of exchange rate volatility on inter-
national trade is ample and not yet settled. In 2004 the IMF completed a literature
review about the topic concluding that neither the economic theory nor the empir-
ical works have reached "the undoubted conclusion that volatility necessarily lowers
trade".
The reasons are many. Firms may decide to hedge against exchange rate ￿uc-
tuations, although at a cost which increases with exchange rate volatility. Expected
pro￿ts tend to rise with volatility according to the standard pro￿t function. For multi-
nationals, that engage in trade with many countries, the tendency of some exchange
rates to move in opposite directions is a natural hedging for the overall exposure to
currency risk. Finally, the impact of volatility may vary with the stage of develop-
ment of a country ,its industrial structure, ￿rm size and on market rigidities. Often,
to justify that expected pro￿ts are reduced by uncertainty over the exchange rate
evolution, convex objective functions were assumed that imply that either ￿rms risk
aversion or the existence of a risk averse manager. 1
A di￿erent wave of empirical investigations on the topic, motivated by the birth of
European Monetary union, has focused attention on examining ex-post the e￿ects of
a complete elimination of exchange rate uncertainty. At the same time, the possibility
that other countries -South America, Africa or Middle East￿currently in the process of
considering the creation of a single currency area thus abandoning a national devise,
keeps an intense interest on the subject and renews the need of a theoretical framework
to provide precise predictions.
Following the path-breaking paper by Rose(1999), many studied price and trade
evolution in the aftermath of the European Monetary Union. A niche of this litera-
ture focused on additional trade generated by new exporters entering a less uncertain
international environment. The work by Baldwin and Di Nino(2006) tries to identify
to what extent the boost in Eurozone trade is attributable to old exporters expanding
1Axel and M￿ller (1997) in a short note point out that ￿rms face numerous risks and only
￿nancial ones are generally hedgeable. "Uncertainty over revenue such as uncertain demand, price
risk, production risk, potential insolvency of customers, transportation risk cannot be generally
covered". Asplund(2002), details other circumstances leading ￿rms to behave as if they were risk-
averse, "non-diversi￿ed owners, liquidity constraints, costly ￿nancial distress, and non-linear tax
systems... delegation to risk averse manager".Heterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints 3
their business rather than new players joining the international scenario. The results
hint at the existence of a modest boost in trade via both the margins. Their analysis
relies on the theoretical bases posed by Melitz(2003) which predicts that liberaliza-
tion increases the number of exporters. Implicitly, this is equivalent to assimilating
exchange rate uncertainty to some kind of trade barrier or ￿xed/sunk cost to export.
What has not been previously modeled, within the ￿rm-heterogeneous literature, is
the mechanism that makes exchange rate volatility equivalent to a trade barrier . 2
Finally, in more recent times, there is a special focus on ￿nancial development
linked to a ￿rm’s growth, the ability to successful enter a market, the productivity
level and the impact of ￿nancing possibilities on exporting decisions. Within a ￿rm-
heterogeneous model ￿ la Melitz, Chaney (2005) introduces the existence of borrowing
constraint as additional barrier to export. Bacchetta, Aghion and Ranciere suggest
that exchange rate volatility a￿ects productivity growth on less ￿nancially integrated
countries, therefore ￿xing the exchange rate makes a good policy. Aghion, Fally,
Scarpetta,(2007) when investigating the e￿ect that ￿nancial development exercises on
the entry possibilities of each ￿rm, ￿nd that only small ￿rms are a￿ected. Financial
integration, as shown by Alfaro and Charlton(2006) raises the number of small ￿rms
on a market and low ￿nancial development prevents companies from growing after
their entry on the market.
The primary scope of this work is to set-up a model able to o￿er micro-foundations
to the common currency e￿ect, identify the channels through which currency risk
depresses trade and identify the exact economic conditions for this to happen. It
explains when the empirical evidences tend to favor the existence of a link between
exchange rate volatility and trade. It also overcomes some limits of the previous
literature, such as the assumptions of risk aversion and undiversi￿ed ￿rms.
In this model the existence of price and labor rigidity combined with borrowing
constraints and exchange rate uncertainty shapes a ￿rm’s optimization problem and
determines which actions are viable to each ￿rm. Considered in the model is a sub-
set of the imperfections subsisting in the real world with showing that each of them
2A ￿rst attempt to justify the Rose’s e￿ect with a model of diversi￿ed ￿rms is due to Baldwin
and Taglioni (2004), their model su￿er from the criticism of previous literature to the extent that
producers are assumed to be risk averse and the e￿ect is not micro-founded. The authors envisaged
a mechanism where zeroing exchange rate volatility boosts the number of exporters and the e￿ect is
magni￿ed when exchange rate volatility is low due to ￿rm size distribution (many small ￿rm with
low productivity, very few ￿rm with high productivity).4 Heterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints
restrains producer’s maximization possibilities. The same logic can be applied to
alternative forms of rigidities. In our framework, whether exchange rate uncertainty
depresses trade depends also on the level of ￿nancial development. Higher devel-
opment lessens the exchange rate uncertainty. As in a standard ￿rm-heterogeneous
model, there exists one threshold domestic producer. Di￿erent from the previous
literature, the model identi￿es two threshold exporters: (1) the marginal exporter
who chose to set the export price in national currency ( the pnc strategy) and (2) the
marginal e￿ciency level which consents to set the price in foreign currency ( the ptm
strategy). The existence of borrowing constraints, which is more binding for smaller
￿rms, implies that the ptm strategy is viable only to big ￿rms. Finally, ￿nancial
integration and exchange rate stabilization a￿ect exports similarly.
An overview of the context and main assumptions of the model is given in Section
(2), a description of the demand side in Section (3). The main body of this work is
contained in Section (4) along with the analysis of the supply. The latter is further
separated into domestic and export markets, respectively in Sections (4.1) and (4.2).
Section (4.3), discusses the consequences of limited availability of ￿nancial resources
on pricing and production alternatives. Section (4.4) and (4.6) investigate the re-
lationship between domestic and export cut-o￿s. The number of active producers
and exporters are computed in Section (4.5). The work measures the impact on the
volume of exports of variation in exchange rate uncertainty and ￿nancial integration
in Section (4.7). Section (5) describes the mechanism that guarantees the match of
demand and supply, Concluding notes are collected in Section (6).
2 Framing the model
This model originates within the ￿eld of ￿rm heterogeneity ￿ la Melitz(2003) and
permits a direct analysis of the e￿ects that exchange rate volatility has on exports,
on exporter pro￿ts, on the decision to enter the export market and on how exporters
behave on the foreign market compared to the domestic market. The existence of
market imperfections such as price stickiness in the goods market, labor rigidities
and incomplete ￿nancial development determine the model predictions.
Households have constant elasticity of substitution (C.E.S) preferences over di￿er-
ent varieties. Firms draw a heterogeneous but constant marginal cost of production
from an exogenous distribution and compete in a monopolistic market. We assumeHeterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints 5
full symmetry between home and abroad in terms of country size, sunk and ￿xed costs,
distribution of marginal costs, exchange rate volatility and values of the exogenous
parameters. In di￿erent terms, domestic and export markets are-in total-identical but
segmented by the existence of exchange rate volatility. As they optimize, ￿rms take
the price index as given (as in standard Dixit-Stiglitz model) because they unable to
in￿uence it with their choices nor are they able to foresee what pricing strategy their
competitors will choose.
There exist two sunk costs (Fd) to produce and supply the domestic market and
(Fx) to export. These permit partitioning of ￿rms in three well known types: non
producers, domestic producers and exporters ( N, D and X type). As producers
￿nance their exporting strategy in a liquidity constrained world and choose to set
the export price in foreign or domestic currency, there will be, depending on the
degree of ￿nancial development and volatility of the exchange rate, two kinds of
exporters-setting the price in national currency (pnc type) and setting the price in
foreign currency (ptm type). In other words, some exporters will adopt a full pass
through strategy while others a pricing to market strategy. The latter produces higher
expected pro￿ts but is more costly and due to borrowing constraints is not viable for
smaller exporters
We assume that ￿rms can only set the price at the beginning of the period. This
hypothesis is in line with the idea that while the exchange rate evolves in continuous
time, there exists a wide empirical literature proving that prices are sticky. Moreover,
labor can only be hired at the beginning of each period and cannot be dismissed before
next period comes. The period of time when rigidities are not resolved is in the short
run and the time when it is possible to re-optimize is in the long run.
By assuming that export price and production capacity are set before the value of
exchange rate is disclosed, we render ￿rms vulnerable to exchange rate ￿uctuations
and, eventually, household subject to rationing. Consumers and ￿rms consider a
di￿erent price index because of the temporal mismatch between consumption and
production choices. Consumers observe the price index after the realization of the
exchange rate shock, but producers base their optimization on the expected value
of the price index. For this reason, the expected function of the price index will be
simply P while the realized value will be labeled Pr; with the latter being a function
of the exchange rate, the former not.
To simplify tractability, we eliminate the unnecessary complications of trade bar-6 Heterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints
riers and assume that the shocks in export sales due to exchange rate evolution are
uniformly distributed around the equilibrium value of one. 3
3 Households
The typical household maximizes the following C.E.S. utility function with constant
elasticity of substitution equal to σ.














subject to the budget constraint:
R
v
pvcvdv ≤ E and to the condition that demand
(cv) must always be smaller or equal to supply (sv).4 The v subscript has been
chosen as mnemonic for the generic variety,p stays for price and c for consumption,
E is the overall expenditure. Similarly we will indicate the variables intended for the
domestic market with the subscript d and for the export market with the subscript
x. For instance the quantity demanded of a domestic variety and an imported one
are cd and cx respectively. Each variety enters the utility function symmetrically no
matter its origin.















The demand schedule depends on the price relative to the price index which re￿ects
the standard C.E.S properties.
3The last assumption is necessary in order to ensure the existence of a closed form solution.
4This condition becomes particularly relevant in our set-up as the supply is decided in advance
based on expectations and may turn out insu￿cient once the exchange rate shock is realized.Heterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints 7
4 FIRMS
This is a model of ￿rm heterogeneity where each ￿rm produces one variety, pays upon
entry a common overhead sunk cost FI, which is associated to the development of a
new variety, before the constant marginal cost of production a is disclosed. The "a"
is drawn from a cumulative distribution G(a) common across countries and de￿ned
over a support (0,amax). Firms in this model maximize pro￿ts (domestic and foreign)
subject to a continuous risk of death with probability δ.
Similarly to Melitz(2003) in this model there are sunk costs for producing in the
domestic market Fd and for exporting Fx that are paid only after the productivity
level is revealed.
4.1 The domestic market
Production technology requires only one factor -labor- employed either for domestic
or foreign production at a constant marginal cost a. ld, is thus a linear function of
domestic output cd and the labor demand which represents at the same time the cost
function equals ld = a × cd.
Labor rigidity does not alter domestic market structure, since the latter a￿ected
by exchange rate shocks only indirectly via the price index. One period expected
operating pro￿ts in the domestic market are given by E(πd) = E(pdcd−acd). Pro￿t





The price index can be expressed as a function of N, indicating the mass of domestic
producers and ∆, the expected values of a weighted average sum of productivities on
the market.5










a1−σdG[ad], this largely simpli￿es notation and conveys better the intuitions. The
marginal costs distribution function is conditioned to ad, the marginal domestic producer; notice
that the second part of ∆ is still unknown and we anticipate in this formula the solution that will
be detailed in section 4.2. We call aptm and apnc the marginal cost associated to the least e￿cient
of the two types of exporters, e is the shock of export sales while τ is a function of exchange rate









Replacing the optimal price in the operating pro￿t function we obtain the expected






Having showed that on the domestic market there are no di￿erences with respect
to the baseline Melitz model, the novelty of this work concentrates on describing the
export market.
4.2 The export market
In order to operate on the export market each ￿rm needs to determine at the begin-
ning of the period what pricing strategy is viable and, on this basis, the number of
workers to hire and the export price. As workers cannot be dismissed at any point
in time, labor cost can be assimilated to a ￿xed cost that must be paid irrespective
of market conditions. Nevertheless its amount is optimally determined by each ￿rm
according to productivity, exchange rate volatility, elasticity of substitution among
varieties and their pricing strategy. Firms can choose to set the price in national
currency or in foreign currency. In the ￿rst case exchange rate ￿uctuations a￿ect
pro￿ts (expressed in national currency) via quantities and in the second case through
prices. In both the cases we assume that the foreign sales are subject to continuous
shocks, e, uniformly distributed between −emax and emax. The density function of
the probability distribution (f(e)) is then simply given by: f(e) = 1
2emax.
4.2.1 Pricing to market strategy
When the exporters set the price in foreign currency (no pass-through), foreign de-
mand does not ￿uctuate but export sales denominated in domestic currency do via
the price channel (a currency depreciation increases sales), as shown by the ￿rst part
of the expression in square brackets in equation 4.2. Knowing the demand schedule;







P (1−σ) [pptm(1 − e) − a]f(e)de (4.2)Heterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints 9
In the above equation we indicated with pptm the price the producer charges for
exports denominated in consumer currency and with E(πptm) the one period expected
operating pro￿t function. From the maximization of 4.2 we obtain that the optimal






As standard in monopolistic competition models, the optimal export price is, , a
constant mark-up over the marginal cost exactly as the one the producer charges in
the domestic market. Therefore choosing the pricing to market strategy permits to
pin-down the foreign demand and hire labor accordingly. Expected ex ante foreign






4.2.2 Full pass through strategy
When the export price is set in national currency (full pass-through), ￿rms needs to
decide independently over price and labor because the export demand ￿uctuates with
the exchange rate. Since the marginal cost is constant, depending on the amount of
labor hired at the beginning of the period, each ￿rm has a determined production
capacity (K), that can be changed only through hiring or layo￿s when the next period
comes. Therefore K represents a capacity constraint which expressed in terms of units
of production is given by the following expression:
K =
E ∗ p−σ
pnc (1 − ek)
P (1−σ) = cpnc (1 − ek) (4.4)
cpnc represents the export demand when the shock is zero and ek determine the maxi-
mum shock such that ex-ante production capacity is still su￿cient to satisfy demand
ex-post. Notice that when a ￿rm chooses over ppnc and K, it is implicitly determining
ek to the extent that equation 4.4 can be rewritten as ek = (cpnc − K)/cpnc. In this





pnc (1 − e)
P (1−σ) f(e)de +
Z ek
−emax
ppncKf(e)de − aK (4.5)10 Heterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints
The expected pro￿ts are a function of the export price ppnc expressed in producer’s
national devise, the price index P, the marginal cost of production a but also of K,
the maximum supply given the labor hired that period. Any time the shock is smaller
than the threshold value ek, production is constrained to K, when it is above ek, the
producer is in duty bound of paying workers (aK), even tough the demand turns
out to be smaller than the planned capacity. The ￿rst addendum of equation (4.5)
represents cases of overcapacity (the capacity constraint is not binding), while in the
second addendum foreign demand exceed K. In other words for any shock smaller
than ek, a ￿rm will be able to meet the foreign demand at a cost which is ￿xed ex-ante
(a × K) but proportional to ￿rm productivity.







pnc (1 − e)
P (1−σ) f(e)de +
Z ek
−emax
ppncKf(e)de − aK (4.6)
s.t. : K =
E ∗ p−σ
pnc (1 − ek)
P (1−σ)








Figure 4.1: The optimal production capacity
The production capacity gets smaller for
higher emax. Firms set a larger K as σ
rises when emax is low and reduces it if
σ rises ifemax is high. Clearly it is more
and more risky for a ￿rm to hire workers
ex-ante when the volatility of export sales
augments. The picture 4.1 plots the value
of K as function of parameters treating   E
P1−σ







is treated as a constantHeterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints 11
Two di￿erent price values satisfy the ￿rst order condition one is positively related to
the marginal production cost a, the second one is negatively related to it.
ppnc = a
σ (1 + emax) ±
q












Investigations of the de￿nitiveness of the Hessian matrix prove the ￿rst to be the
unique optimal price (see A.1 for details).
The mark up is an increasing function of sales volatility. The capacity constraint is
negatively related to volatility and coincides with the expected demand when volatil-
ity is zero.







where Ω = [στemax(1−σ)+emax(1−σ)2+στ(στ+1−σ)]
στ2
6.
Pro￿ts are proportional to productivity and inversely related to the number of
operating ￿rms, as varieties are more easily substitutable (bigger σ) the optimal
mark-up shrinks and pro￿ts follows. While higher σ values tend to depress the value
of τ and Ω, volatility unambiguously depresses pro￿ts on an overall basis as it raises
the value of τ and lowers that of Ω. In the two sub￿gures 3(a) and 3(b) τ and Ω are
plotted as function of the parameters σ and emax.
Comparing the two strategies in terms of pro￿ts and prices, we conclude that
the "no pass through" pricing dominates the "full pass through" pricing. It yields
higher expected pro￿ts, lower prices and a larger market share. At the same time it
is more expensive as it entails a larger number of workers to be hired. The presence
of liquidity constraints and a low degree of ￿nancial sector development makes this
alternative viable only to the most e￿cient producers that can employ their pure
pro￿t-earned on the domestic market- to ￿nance exporting plans.
6Sales from selling abroad are given by: Spnc = E
(τ∗a)
1−σ
N∆ ∗ [ σ
σ−1 −
emax(σ−1)
σ∗τ2 ]12 Heterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints
Figure 4.2: τ and Ω: the e￿ect of volatility on prices and pro￿ts
(a)   (b)
4.3 Liquidity constraint
Upon payment of sunk and labor costs, ￿rms will be able to produce and sell. Con-
sequently ￿nancing possibilities become very important to determine the viability
of attractive investment strategies. Firms should use export revenues as collateral
in ￿nancing operations, but export revenues are subject to exchange rate volatility.
The domestic ￿nancial sector-that is not model explicitly,-cannot fully hedge against
exchange rate volatility because it hits every ￿rm symmetrically while an interna-
tionally integrated ￿nancial system is able to pool the risk across ￿rms of di￿erent
countries.7 Therefore a ￿rm’s ￿nancing possibilities strictly depends on the degree
of ￿nancial development of a nation. Firms operating in integrated countries face
weaker liquidity constraints and are able to obtain greater pro￿ts on average.
In this model, an exogenous parameters λ, ranging between 0 and 1 proxies the
level of ￿nancial development (development falls when λ rises. The ￿nancial system
will accept as collateral the entire value of domestic sales (since these are not subject
to exchange rate volatility shocks, but only a fraction proportional to λ and emax of
volatile foreign sales. Therefore in the absence exchange rate uncertainty, exports
will be treated as domestic production, the same is true when ￿nancial integration is
7We are implicitly assuming that the level of development is strictly related to the degree of
￿nancial integration of a country with its trading partners. Developed systems are able to share the
risk also with foreign ￿nancial operators.Heterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints 13
complete. Firms need to cover labor and sunk costs with these resources.
While the choice of entering the domestic market is not a￿ected by liquidity con-
straints, exporting will be a viable option only when a fraction of expected foreign
sales and pure domestic pro￿t cover both labor and exporting sunk costs. This condi-
tions will be exploited to ￿nd the two cut-o￿ exporters, one for each pricing strategy
by imposing that ￿nancial resources at disposal of a ￿rm are just su￿cient to cover
costs.
The model shares with the recent works by Chaney and Aghion, Fally and Scar-
petta, the assumption of the existence of liquidity constraint in a heterogeneous world
but formalizes and justi￿es it on di￿erent grounds. Chaney(2005) assumes that ￿rms
are endowed with a random liquidity shock, additional to domestic pro￿ts, which
may or may not be correlated with ￿rm productivity and justi￿es it as coming from
an inheritance. In addition the ￿nancial system applies di￿erent criteria to ￿nance
domestic and export production to the extent that " a ￿rm may ￿nd investors for any
investment regarding domestic activities, but none whatsoever for exporting activi-
ties". In his model, similarly to this one, liquidity constraints reveal to be important
barrier to export; otherwise from Chaney’s model in this model liquidity constraints
are correlated to ￿rm’s e￿ciency and determine also the pricing policy of exporting
￿rms.". Again similar, liquidity constraints reveal to be an important barrier to ex-
port;, Dissimilar from Chaney’s model, liquidity constraints are correlated to a ￿rm’s
e￿ciency and it also determines the pricing policy of exporting ￿rms. Aghion, Fally
and Scarpetta(2007) instead use the credit constraint in order to study a ￿rm’s entry
dynamics and post-entry growth. According to their empirical evidences small ￿rms
are a￿ected by credit restrictions and bene￿t the most from ￿nancial development.
Also, the level of ￿nancial development fosters the growth of successful ￿rms after
entry. Finally in their model small does not mean ine￿cient. There are small ￿rms
which are more productive than large ones.
4.4 The zero pro￿t condition and the borrowing constraints
When the resources borrowed from the ￿nancial system at zero cost are su￿cient
to cover the cost of operating on the domestic or on the export market, production
decisions will be implementable. The three conditions to determine the domestic14 Heterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints
cut-o￿ and the two exporting cut-o￿s, one for each pricing strategy become:
ad : πd = δ ∗ Fd (4.10)
The above equation says that the stream of discounted operating domestic pro￿ts
(given by the one period pro￿ts divided the constant ￿rm death-rate δ) must cover









σ ∗ τ2 ]−K∗apnc = δ∗(Fx+Fd)
(4.11)
In equation 4.11 the stream of operating domestic pro￿ts plus a fraction propor-
tional to volatility and ￿nancial integration (1 − λ ∗ emax) of the stream of expected
export sales cover the two sunk costs for producing domestically and exporting ( Fx
and Fd) plus the labor cost identi￿ed by K ∗ apnc.
The cut-o￿ condition for "pricing to market" to be feasible (equation 4.12) is similar
to the previous expression with the only di￿erence that export sales and labor costs
to be sustained are larger.





[(1 − λ ∗ emax) ∗ pptm − aptm] = δ ∗ (Fx + Fd) (4.12)
Notice that only the domestic cut-o￿ condition is still a zero-pro￿t condition. There
are ￿rms which are prevented from operating abroad because of borrowing constraints,
whose e￿ciency would ensure an expected positive pro￿t from exporting.






for the pricing in consumer’s currency strategy and
λ ≤
στ[2 + σ(τ − 1) − emax(σ − 1)] + emax (σ − 1)
2
emax (σ2τ2 − emax(σ − 1)
2)
= λpnc
for pricing in exporter’s currency. The existence of a positive threshold also when
sunk costs are zero is clearly due to the existence of labor costs that ￿rms pay re-
gardless of consumer demand realization ex-post.Heterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints 15
λptm is always smaller than λpnc regardless of other exogenous parameters, there-
fore as λ or emax shrinks the ￿rst concrete possibility of exporting entails pricing
in national currency; only when integration deepens or exchange rate stabilize, the
more pro￿table option of pricing in consumer’s currency becomes valid. The plot






This implies that if λ > λpnc no ￿rm will be able to export and for λptm < λ < λpnc
only the "full pass through strategy" will be implementable.
Under perfect symmetry, the domestic and export cut-o￿s, the number of ￿rms, as
well as the ∆ coincide in the two countries D and F (for domestic and foreign country
respectively); the three cut-o￿ conditions o￿er then a short-cut to obtain the relation
between marginal producer and the two marginal exporter types:
































2 + (1 − λemax)τ − σ−1





Being that ptm is a dominating strategy as soon as aptm > apnc every exporter will im-
plement the "no pass through" strategy. The condition is veri￿ed when λ ≤ 1
σ∗emax =
λaptm. Between λaptm and λptm the two types of exporters coexist.
Similarly to Melitz(2003) there are conditions to be imposed on the exogenous pa-
rameters for exporting ￿rms to be more e￿cient than domestic ones. Assuming Fx
is equal to zero , this condition is veri￿ed for λ > λaptm. Intuitively if exporting does
not entail additional cost then at the point when pricing to market strategy becomes
feasible to every ￿rm, they will start exporting by choosing not to pass through ex-
change rate ￿uctuation onto consumers. Finally, as soon as Fx ≥ Fd, exporters are a
subset of the most e￿cient producers. This is graphically proved in ￿gure 4.4 which
plots equations 4.13, 4.14, 4.15 and illustrate the relationship existing among the
three cut-o￿s when Fx = Fd.
Figure 4.4: Cut-o￿s ratios
The only plot to go above one is
aptm
apnc
when ￿nancial integration is strong
and exchange rate volatility volatility
is low. The ratio of
apnc
ad is less than one
for emax 6= 0,
aptm
ad for emax 6= 0 and for
λ 6= 0, con￿rming that exporters are
always more productive than domestic
producers.
4.5 The equilibrium number of producers and exporters
To obtain an explicit solution for the number of ￿rms and the cut-o￿s, the cumulative
density function so far named simply G[a] has to be modeled explicitly. It is usual in
this literature to assume a pareto cumulative distribution of marginal costs: G[a] =
( a
amax)b8.
8As in Melitz(2003), for this model to be solvable, we need to guarantee through a restriction
on the parameter of the pareto distribution and the elasticity of substitution that the integral in ∆
converges by assuming that b + 1 ≥ σHeterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints 17
Replacing the marginal cost distribution in the de￿nition of ∆ and solving the
domestic cut-o￿ condition, equation (4.10), for N we obtain:
N =
E (b − σ + 1)
Fdσb
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We know that only a fraction of domestic ￿rms will export and this fraction is de￿ned
by the ratio of
G[apnc]











Volatility together with a low level of ￿nancial integration impedes some ￿rms to
export but allows relatively ine￿cient ones (those around the ad) to stay on the
domestic stage since it lowers the degree of competition within a country. Reducing
uncertainty or increasing ￿nancial integration raises the number of exporters but
reduces the domestic producers. In the range of λ values where both pricing strategies
are present, it also allows some exporters to replace the pnc with the ptm strategy.
Doing this lessens the price index and via the competition channel boosts the average
productivity. This happens in addition to the standard selection e￿ect typical of
￿rm heterogeneous models where new producers start exporting because of trade
liberalization and the least e￿cient domestic producers exit the market.
Below we provide a graphical representation of what was just a￿rmed by plotting
the number of producers, exporters and the total number of ￿rms active on a single
market as function of volatility and ￿nancial integration for given values of the other
exogenous variables.
The e￿ect of exchange rate uncertainty on the overall number of producers operating
on the domestic market is slightly non monotonic in ( emax): it tends to decrease
starting from a very high value of emax and to increase if the reduction occurs when
volatility is low. Financial integration has the unambiguous e￿ect of raising the
number of ￿rms. Despite the non linear behavior it is possible to assess that the
number is unquestionably higher when emax = 0 than when emax = 1.
Melitz(2003) reaches the same result when he states that in countries that are marginally18 Heterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints
Figure 4.5: Number of active producers (white scale), of exporters (colored scale), of
active ￿rm on each market(grey scale)
(E=1000000, FI=Fd=Fx=100, δ = 0.2, b = 2.5 σ = 2.5,amax = 1)
liberalized, liberalization may lead to fewer active ￿rms on the market. 9
4.6 Free entry
While the number of active ￿rms is related to the size of the economy and sunk
costs Fx and Fd,the existence of an innovation cost FI guarantees the existence of an
equilibrium in this economy, despite the continuous process of entering and exiting
due to the exogenous probability of dying in each period ( δ).FI is such that potential
entrants will earn in equilibrium an expected pro￿t equal to zero from entering the
market. This extra condition of equilibrium pins down the domestic cut-o￿ ad
10:
9Melitz adds that the productivity selection mechanism outweighs the variety e￿ect in terms of
welfare and liberalization is always welfare improving.
10Replacing the solution for N,the de￿nition of ∆, using the distribution of marginal cost and









































































































To obtain the cut-o￿ exporters aptm and apnc ,equation 4.17 is replaced in 4.13 and
4.14.
The three cut-o￿s obtained are plotted in ￿gure 4.6
Figure 4.6: Marginal producer (white plot) and exporter type ptm (colored plot) and exporter
type pnc (grey plot)
(E=1000000 FI=Fd=Fx=100, δ = 0.2,b = 2.5, amax = 1)
In line with the ￿ndings about the number of ￿rms, uncertainty and lack of ￿nan-
cial development, acting on competition, tend to increase the threshold for domestic
producers and to make exporting harder for both types of exporters. Nevertheless
the e￿ect on the two types of exporters di￿ers in magnitude as the aptm is more
responsive.20 Heterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints
In ￿gure 4.6 the ptm are represented by the segment on the z axis between the
origin and the colored line, the pnc exporters by the distance between the colored
plot and the grey one and the domestic producers (which only serve the domestic
market) by the distance between the highest of the colored and grey and the white
plot. Finally pnc exporters disappear from the market when λ and emax are low
(below aptm), con￿rming what said in section 4.4.
4.7 The volume of trade
Similarly to trade restrictions the lack of ￿nancial integration and the existence of
exchange rate uncertainty a￿ects cut-o￿s and in some cases export prices. At the
same time it is not obvious that this similarity carries to the impact they have on the
volume of exports. So far we have studied policies of ￿rms in terms of pricing and
capacity, computed the expected value of pro￿ts, obtained the number of producers
per market and the three type of thresholds. Addressed next is what happens to
the total volume of trade when these two exogenous variables are modi￿ed by some
external event. For instance the consequences of the common currency adoption on
the overall volume of trade are very important to the policy makers, more so than on
any single ￿rm. Policy maker evaluate the e￿ectiveness of a plan based mainly on its
macroeconomic e￿ects.
In a standard ￿rm heterogeneous model, trade liberalization entails an increase of
trade volumes. The same conclusion is not granted in this model where the impact
di￿ers depending on a ￿rm’s productivity. Therefore this section is dedicated to
evaluate the impact of exchange rate stabilization and ￿nancial integration on overall
export volumes.
At the optimum, the volume of total exports represented by ptm and pnc type of






























The ￿rst addendum in curly brackets is the volume of trade associated to ptm ex-
porters, the remaining part of the expression within brackets is the volume of exports
generated by pnc exporters. In ￿rst place the e￿ect depends on presence of pnc type
of exporters: as long as both the kind of exporters are on the market, which means asHeterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints 21
far as integration is low enough and export shocks are su￿ciently volatile, then these
two variables have the power to in￿uence trade. When the pnc type disappears, then
they stop a￿ecting volume of trade.
Nonetheless, when the e￿ect exists, we still recognize that borrowing restraints
and export shocks alter the volume of trade through di￿erent channels. Restraints
modify trade indirectly via the two exporting thresholds. Shocks via a twofold conduit
by varying the two exporting threshold and more directly also the optimal price and
capacity building.
Analyzing the expression we are able to ascertain that lower volatility reduces ∆,
ad, τ, increases the expression in square brackets, raises aptm and diminishes apnc, this
we knew from ￿gure 4.6; (apnc − aptm) shrinks as emax tends to zero.
In conclusion, researchers should expect to ￿nd a signi￿cant relation of causality
between exchange rate volatility and trade depending on the stage of development of
a country and the level of volatility .Therefore, there are relevant threshold e￿ects to
be considered in empirical estimations.
5 Searching costs ￿ll the gap between demand and
supply
In this model consumers purchasing possibilities are constrained by supply, which is
set ex ante due to market rigidities.
In the case of the imported varieties, whose price is set in the exporter currency, a
depreciation of exporter’s currency below (1−ek), by making them cheaper, increases
their demand, beyond maximum available supply (K). This is a consequence of the
fact that producers decide both price and capacity in advance.
To re-establish the equilibrium between demand and supply we assume the exis-
tence of a costly research of the import variety. More precisely, for each variety the
additional searching cost, expressed in units of consumer currency, is proportional to







where c is the cost of searching and Ev is the share of income spent on variety v. The22 Heterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints
price paid by the consumer (pc)is endogenously determined to clear the market:





1−e is the price set by the exporter in the consumer’s currency and c is
endogenously determined.
A similar situation happens for domestically produced varieties and imported va-
rieties (whose price is set in consumer’s currency). When the exporter’s currency
appreciates above the equilibrium level, the indirect channel of transmission is rep-
resented by the price index. This is taken as given by each producer when deciding
over production strategy since it is unknown to each of them the proportion of ￿rms
that will opt for ptm rather than pnc strategies and what will be the shock. When
the currency appreciates, these varieties become relatively cheaper and the demand
rises above the maximum supply. Equilibrium is reestablished between demand and
supply by a mechanism very much like the one just illustrated.
6 Final remarks
This model is unique in that it introduces- for the ￿rst time- real rigidities and market
imperfections in a ￿rm heterogeneous framework. It presents a set of results which
enable the formulation of clear predictions about the characteristics a ￿rm must have
to be shielded from exchange rate uncertainty. In particular, a ￿rm must belong to
the subset of the most e￿cient and operate within a country whose ￿nancial system is
su￿ciently integrated. This happens because the ￿nancial system accepts as collateral
the entire domestic sales to the extent that they are not subject to uncertainty, and
a fraction of the operation of export sales, varying with the maturity of the system
itself and the riskiness.
It is worth noting that even the least integrated ￿nancial system (λ = 1) will
lend no less than the amount of resources equivalent to exporting sales under the
worst case (e = emax). As the country progresses, operation of international hedging
against the exchange rate variations becomes available encouraging more lending. In
this situation only large ￿rms expect to gain enough extra pro￿ts from domestic sales
to ￿nance the exporting choice. As a consequence, two exporter types will exist in
the same market. A ￿rst set operating via a pricing to market strategy and a secondHeterogeneous ￿rms, shocks to export and ￿nancial restraints 23
set composed by smaller, and less e￿cient producers which can only access resources
for pricing the foreign market in national currency. Due to rigidities, the last strategy
implies price and production capacity set before the currency value is disclosed. The
price is still a mark-up over the marginal cost but it becomes a function of exchange
rate volatility- integration and stabilization lead to a lower price index. In terms of
production, the fact that exporters respond to uncertainty under building capacity
depends on pro￿tability of exporting and by the same token, ￿rms may ask to be
compensated for the extra risk they face on the export market charging higher mark-
ups. Finally, being that production capacity and price is set in advance, the model
turns out to be a disequilibrium model, when consumers see their demand unsatis￿ed.
Stability of exchange rates encourages new exporters to join the international trade
system, increases international competition and forces out of the market less e￿cient
domestic ￿rms. In addition it extends the range of producers that implement the
no pass through strategy. Similar changes are brought about by ￿nancial integration.
There exist a threshold value of λ below which all exporters will adopt a ptm pricing
and exchange rate volatility stops reducing export.
In the light of our ￿ndings, the modest size of the "euro e￿ect" on both price and
trade in Europe is the outcome of a ￿nancially developed system and very low ex-
change rate volatility pre-existing the monetary union. Next, empirical investigations
must be directed at measuring the e￿ect volatility exercises on the trade of develop-
ing countries and on the exports of small ￿rms. In terms of pricing, it would be very
interesting to explore whether small versus large ￿rm size implies full versus no pass
through of exchange rate on price.A Appendix:
A.1 Derivation of optimality conditions for pnc exporters
Most of the derivations in this paper are straightforward. Probably the only passages
which deserve some attention are those concerning the optimization problem of ex-
porters who set the price in national currency. Solving the integral of equation 4.5,
























s.t. : K =
E ∗ p−σ
pnc (1 − ek)
P (1−σ)
This is a simple maximization subject to a constraint. We replace the constraint in
the objective function and derive the f.o.c.s with respect to the price and the capacity































































Similarly taking the ￿rst order derivative of the pro￿t function with respect to ppnc
and replacing the optimal K in the f.o.c we obtain two prices which satisfy the f.o.c.s.




(1 − σ)E ∗ p−σ
pnc

















replacing the solution for K into the f.o.c for the price and rearranging the expression
we obtain the optimal price.


















































σ (1 + emax) ±
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σ (1 + emax) ± Ψ
2(σ − 1)
(A.5)
A.2 Proving uniqueness of optimal export price.

















cpnc (emax + 1)
2 +
K2(1+σ)
















In order to prove that there is an optimum and that is unique we investigate the
sign of
∂πpnc
∂2px and of the determinant. If
∂πpnc
∂2pv is negative de￿nite and the determinant
IIis positive then we have a point of maximum, If
∂πpnc
∂2ppnc is positive de￿nite and the
determinant is positive then we have a point of minimum and otherwise we have a
saddle point.
The determinant of H evaluated at K and
ppnc = a




det(H) = (σ − 1)
σ(1 + emax)Ψ + Ψ2
emax(σ(1 + emax) + Ψ)2
and is positive for any value. The determinant of H evaluated at K and
ppnc = a




detH = (1 − σ)
σ(emax + 1)Ψ − Ψ2
emax(σ(emax + 1) − Ψ)2
In this case the determinant is negative for σ > 2emax
1+e2
max which is always veri￿ed.
Plotting the two determinants as function of the two variables σ and emax we convey
graphical intuition.









[(σ − 1)(1 − emax)
2 + 2(1 − ek)
2]
The sign depends on the expression in square brackets which is clearly always positive.
Therefore the overall expression is proved to be negative. The expresssion
∂πpnc
∂2ppnc is
negative for any value of ppnc therefore we can conclude that A.6 is a point of maximum
and A.7 is a saddle point.
IIIFigure A.1: Hessian determinant
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